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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 88 Transit Lines, Inc. (the "Company") has petitioned 
this court for review from a final order of the National Labor 
Relations Board entered in supplemental backpay proceedings (88 
Transit Lines, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 324 (1994)) and the NLRB has 
cross-applied for enforcement of the same order. 
 I. 
 The supplemental backpay proceeding followed our 
decision enforcing an earlier NLRB finding that the Company 
discriminated against its employees when, shortly after a 
 representation election conducted at the Company's 
facility, the Company replaced its transit run schedule which had 
been in effect for many years, Schedule B, with a Schedule C, 
thereby decreasing the total number of fixed transit runs by one 
and eliminating run 14, reducing the number of transit runs which 
  
were open for bids, and making the fixed runs subject to 
discretionary assignment by the Company rather than open for bids 
based on seniority.  The Board found that the scheduling change 
violated 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) and (3) and ordered the Company 
to "make employees whole for any losses they may have suffered as 
a result of these unlawful actions" and this court entered 
judgment enforcing the order.  See 88 Transit Lines, Inc., 300 
N.L.R.B. 177 (1990), enforced, 937 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1991).   
 When the parties failed to agree on the amount of 
backpay, the Regional Director issued a backpay specification 
alleging the amount owed to the discriminatees.  Following a 
hearing, an ALJ recommended amending the backpay specification in 
two aspects.  First, the ALJ recommended not awarding backpay to 
fourteen replacement workers who had been hired during the 
backpay period, reasoning that "such employees have no losses to 
be restored to them, since they were not employed at the time of 
the elimination of run 14."  Second, the ALJ recommended treating 
as interim earnings any amount by which post-unfair labor 
practice earnings exceeded employee earnings during the base-
period year.   
 The Board refused to adopt these recommended amendments 
to the backpay specification.  It ordered backpay for all twenty-
three employees, including the fourteen replacement employees, 
and refused to reduce their gross backpay by post-unfair labor 
practice earnings which exceeded the base period earnings because 
to do so would "inappropriate[ly] appl[y] . . . the interim 
earnings' concept to a case involving a violation other than 
  
discharge from employment, and . . . effectively resolve[] 
uncertainties in favor of the wrongdoer."  The Board ordered 
backpay to be calculated in accordance with the original 
specification, plus interest and less tax withholdings required 
by law.   
 This court has jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) 
and (f).  On questions of law, appellate review of the Board's 
decision is plenary, although that decision is entitled to 
deference due to the Board's expertise in labor matters.  NLRB v. 
Louton, Inc., 822 F.2d 412, 414 (3d Cir. 1987).  The Board's 
findings of fact in a backpay proceeding will be overturned if 
the record, considered as a whole, shows no substantial evidence 
to support those findings.  Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 
U.S. 474 (1951).  We will not disturb a backpay order "'unless it 
can be shown that the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends 
other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the 
policies of the Act.'"  Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 
339 U.S. 203, 216 (1964) (quoting Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. 
NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943)). 
II. 
 It is undisputed that the backpay specification issued 
by the Regional Director correctly designated the backpay period 
to be between November 29, 1987, when the Company first 
instituted the schedule change, and August 18, 1991, when the 
Company restored run 14, a total of 194 weeks.  Both parties also 
agree that the implementation of schedule C represented a loss to 
the bargaining unit of 2-3/4 hours of work per day, or 13-3/4 
  
hours per week, and that the wage rate for the discriminatees was 
$6.75 per hour.   
 In arguing that the Board's order is not supported by 
substantial evidence and an abuse of discretion, the Company 
raises essentially three claims of error:  (1) the Board erred in 
finding that the fourteen replacement drivers were entitled to 
compensation; (2) the Board erred in declining to treat as 
interim earnings the amount by which the discriminatees' post-
unfair labor practice annual earnings exceeded their base-period 
year earnings with the Company; and (3) the ALJ's post-hearing 
amendment of the backpay specification denied the Company 
procedural due process.1   
 The Company argues that the fourteen replacement 
drivers are not entitled to compensation for backpay because they 
were hired after the schedule change went into effect and, thus, 
they suffered no change in their schedules entitling them to 
compensation.  By way of analogy, it relies on Systems 
Management, Inc. v. NLRB, 901 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1990), to argue 
                     
1
.  The Company also argues that the backpay specification failed 
to establish any loss of earnings by any employee during the 
backpay period and was therefore speculative and an undeserved 
windfall to the employees.  The Company agrees that a compliance 
officer may employ a formula other than one of the standard 
formulae when application of the standard formula is not 
feasible.  In this case, the General Counsel specified the names 
of the twenty-three discriminatees and the number of hours each 
worked during the backpay period and, applying the backpay 
formula, calculated that each discriminatee lost $4.04 per week 
for each week worked during the backpay period.  The backpay 
formula adopted by the Board is reasonable in light of the nature 
of the violation and is entitled to our deference.  See NLRB v. 
Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346-47 (1953).   
  
that the Board's award of backpay to the fourteen replacement 
drivers was punitive rather than compensatory because it "cannot 
be considered a restoration to any status quo ante, as no status 
quo ante existed for these employees."  Id. at 308 (quotation 
omitted).   
 The Company's reliance on Systems Management, however, 
is misplaced.  In Systems Management, this court enforced a cease 
and desist order and a make-whole order where a successor 
employer failed to offer employment to its predecessor's 
employees or to recognize their bargaining representative, Local 
29, and instead contracted with another union, Local 327, at a 
substantially lower wage rate.  Id. at 301.  The court declined 
to enforce a backpay award for new hires affiliated with Local 
327 who "if anything . . . were beneficiaries of [the employer's] 
discriminatory conduct, because the result of [the employer's] 
decision not to employ the Local 29 workers culminated in the 
employment of the Local 327 workers."  Id. at 308.  
 This case presents quite different facts.  The fourteen 
replacement employees were hired to replace original bargaining 
unit employees who departed in the normal course of business.  
Therefore, the replacement employees cannot be said to be the 
"beneficiaries" of the discriminatory conduct.  Rather, the 
change in schedule caused a loss of work for the entire 
bargaining unit.  The Board correctly found that the remedy was 
to inure to the benefit of the entire bargaining unit.  The award 
of backpay to the fourteen replacement employees was not 
"'punitive or confiscatory'" and was "'reasonably adapted to the 
  
situation that call[ed] for the redress.'"  See Frito-Lay, Inc. 
v. NLRB, 585 F.2d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 1978) (quoting NLRB v. 
Townhouse T.V. & Appliances, Inc., 531 F.2d 826, 830 (7th Cir. 
1976)).    
 The Company's second argument is that the Board's 
refusal to deduct post-unfair labor practice earnings which 
exceeded base-year earnings from the gross backpay violated the 
long-standing principle that discriminatees must mitigate damages 
and that gross backpay must be reduced by interim earnings to 
derive a net backpay award.  The Company refers us to a leading 
case on the mitigation doctrine, NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 
472 F.2d 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1972), as well as to NLRB guidelines.   
 This argument must also fail.  It is true that 
mitigation of loss of earnings is a cardinal principle in the 
development of remedial orders under the National Labor Relations 
Act.  See Tubari Ltd. v. NLRB, 959 F.2d 451, 454 (3d Cir. 1992).  
In this case, however, the higher post-unfair labor practice 
earnings by bargaining unit members were attributable to 
fluctuations in the amount of available work during the 
applicable time period rather than to the restoration of lost 
work by the Company.  It is reasonable to assume that but for the 
Company's discriminatory conduct and the elimination of transit 
run 14, the earnings of the bargaining unit employees might have 
been still higher.  Thus, the higher post-unfair labor practice 
earnings were not interim earnings which need be deducted from 
gross backpay.  The Company has provided us with no authority for 
its argument that it can avoid the payment of backpay liability 
  
for its discriminatory schedule change simply because 
discriminatees happened to do better financially during the 
backpay period than during the base-year period.2  The burden was 
on the Company "to establish facts which would negative the 
existence of liability to a given employee or which would 
mitigate that liability."  NLRB v. Brown & Root, Inc., 311 F.2d 
447, 454 (8th Cir. 1963).  Accord Buncher v. NLRB, 405 F.2d 787, 
789-90 (3d Cir. 1968) (in banc), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 828 
(1969).  This it has not done.  We find the Company's argument 
that the gross backpay should be reduced by the excess earnings 
to be without merit.3 
 III. 
                     
2
.  The Company argues that the Board erred when it suggested in 
its Supplemental Order that the interim earnings principle 
applies only with respect to employees who have been unlawfully 
discharged.  It cites Ironton Publications, Inc., 313 N.L.R.B. 
1208 (1994), as an example of a case where the Board's backpay 
order was reduced by interim earnings for a part-time employee 
whose hours were discriminatorily reduced but who was not fired.  
We do not read the Board's Supplemental Order to mean that 
reduction for interim earnings is never appropriate in a non-
discharge case.  Rather, we limit our holding to approval of the 
Board's rejection of the need to reduce backpay by interim 
earnings in this case, where the employees continued to work for 
the same company and there was no showing that they would not 
have absorbed the hours stipulated to have been lost by the 
unfair labor practice. 
3
.  The Company's final argument is that the ALJ's post-hearing 
amendment of the backpay specification did not afford the Company 
an adequate opportunity to produce evidence of employee interim 
earnings.  In light of our holding that the backpay award need 
not be reduced by what the Company characterizes as "interim 
earnings," consideration of the Company's contentions on this 
issue is unnecessary.   
  
 For the reasons set forth, we will deny the Petition 
for Review of the Order of the National Labor Relations Board 
issued on July 12, 1994 and grant the Cross-Application for 
Enforcement of the Order of the National Labor Relations Board 
issued on July 12, 1994. 
